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Interoception is the perception of internal bodily states. Individuals with heightened interoceptive 
accuracy (IA) have been found to have more frequent and intense emotional experiences than 
those with average or poor IA. One proposed mechanism for these differences is a positive 
association between IA and attention more broadly. The goal of the present study is to explore 
attentional processes as a function of IA via the Attentional Blink (AB). The AB is defined as a 
reduced accuracy when two targets occur in short succession from each other in a rapid stream of 
stimuli. Emotional stimuli at the second target reduces the AB while emotional stimuli at the first 
target enhances the AB. The present study examined how behavioral performance and the P300 
component of event-related potentials in an AB paradigm is impacted by IA. Healthy 
undergraduates completed a cardiac awareness task, in which they counted the number of 
heartbeats they felt without taking their pulse, which was then compared to an objective count of 
their heartbeats. Based on previously-validated cut scores, 19 high perceivers and 19 average 
perceivers (matched for age and sex) then completed an AB task with emotional and/or neutral 
lexical stimuli at T1 and/or T2. Results showed that individuals with average IA performed 
worse when T1 and T2 were incongruent in terms of affect; similarly, their P300 amplitude to 
the second target in these conditions was significantly attenuated. Individuals with high IA, 
however, did not elicit a modulated P300 in any condition; behaviorally, they performed better 
when both stimuli were congruent in terms of affect. The implications and applications of the 
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Introduction 
Precisely what is an emotion, and where it comes from, is a matter of ongoing debate 
(Izard, 2011). One key controversy around the origin and experience of emotions centers on 
whether emotions are the interpretation of bodily signals, or if the body, instead, responds as an 
interpretation of thoughts (Dalgleish, 2004). Cognitive science has emerged as an important 
contributor to this debate. The sub-field of affective neuroscience addresses the interaction of 
mind, body, and brain to better understand both emotions and cognition (Dalgleish, 2004; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Individual differences in emotional experience rely on perception of 
both exogenous (e.g., presence of threatening or pleasant stimuli) and endogenous variables (e.g., 
state- and trait-level cognitive and psychological processes), and have been demonstrated in 
ample laboratory studies (Doré, Zerubavel, & Ochsner, 2014; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-
Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013). One cognitive process that 
has gained increased attention in the literature is that of interoception, the perception of internal 
physiological bodily states, which has been used an index of emotional sensitivity and 
psychopathology (Craig, 2010; Dalgleish, 2004; Paulus, 2015; Paulus & Stein, 2010; Seth, 2013; 
Wiens, 2005). The goal of the present study is to explore the connection between interoception, 
perception of emotional stimuli, and attention. 
The Role of the Body in Emotion 
The systematic study of body-emotion interaction began with Darwin (1872), who 
suggested that there are basic and universal human emotions that are expressed using bodily 
signals. Following this postulation, James (1884) suggested that emotion is the direct 
interpretation of bodily sensations: one feels sad because one cries, and not the other way 
around. Cannon (1931) stated that emotional experience happens too rapidly for the brain to 
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interpret every visceral signal, and that emotions occur regardless of neural connections to the 
body; therefore, emotions and bodily signals occur simultaneously. A final, and still influential, 
theory is presented by Schacter and Singer (1962) who suggested that the context of arousal 
matters in determining the emotional label of its experience: a racing heart on the battlefield is 
different than a racing heart from sexual arousal. There have also been additional theories and 
models of emotion that extend these three main examples (Dalgleish, 2004; Friedman, 2010). For 
example, the Somatovisceral Afference Model of Emotion (SAME) has been proposed as a 
compromise that suggests that each of the main theories of emotion occurs as, and if, 
appropriate. However, the more ambiguous the emotion, the more cognitive the processing is 
(Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2014). While it is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper 
to fully address the controversies and evidence of any of the theories of emotion, central to each 
of these theories is that perceiving bodily signals is essential to emotional experience in some 
way (Dalgleish, 2004; Friedman, 2010). It is notable, though, that the field is still deciding how 
to answer basic questions that Darwin, James, and Canon posed in the late 19th century: what is 
an emotion, what is the role of the body in its generation, and what is its impact on the human 
experience? Norman and colleagues (2014, p. 121) suggest that these were questions posed 
ahead of their time, before the field was equipped to properly investigate them. It is only in the 
past several decades that these questions can adequately be explored. The present study aims to 
further our understanding of the relation of emotion, cognition, and the body.  
Interoception: the perception of bodily states 
The process of perceiving bodily signals is known as interoception (Craig, 2002). 
Interoception is distinct from proprioception (an awareness of the body’s place in space and 
time) and exteroception (the awareness of external stimuli) (Craig, 2002, 2003). In the late 19th 
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Century, philosophers and physiologists (e.g., Weber, Sherrington, and James) suggested that 
there is a separation between the perception obtained via the five main sensory inputs and those 
that perceive internal states and correspond to arousal and self-regulation (Craig, 2002). 
Increasing data from humans and non-humans at the time suggested that this distinction is what 
defined consciousness as an internal function rather than the consequence of external sources. In 
short, these individuals suggested that interoception was the foundation and basis of 
consciousness. Contemporary psychological and neuroimaging studies continue to confirm these 
original postulations and now include interoception as key to self-regulation and maintaining 
homeostasis (Craig, 2002, 2003, 2010; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). 
Interoception was initially proposed to be the perception of visceral signals, though the 
list of systems included in the construct now include a wide range of sensations ranging from 
temperature and pain to satiety (thirst, hunger, etc.) and fatigue (Craig, 2002). Interoception is a 
diffuse process that relies on afferent and efferent neurons located throughout the body and every 
layer of the nervous system: in short, it is the integration of sensations from the entire body 
(Craig, 2003). Within the Central Nervous System, the main sources of sensory integration are 
those most strongly associated with individual differences in interoception, including the 
hypothalamus, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor areas (SMA), amygdala, 
and insula (Craig, 2002, 2003; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). These sites 
integrate the multimodal inputs that pertain to bodily sensations (Craig, 2003). The function of 
these sites, particularly the insula, are consistently observed in the study of emotion, to the point 
where they have been found to be activated in “virtually every imaging study of human 
emotions” providing a sense of a physical self and a basis for which consciousness and emotion 
may develop (Craig, 2003, p. 503).  
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The measurement of interoception corresponds to individual differences in a host of 
cognitive and emotional processes (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). Interoception itself is proposed 
to be comprised of three components: interoceptive sensibility, interoceptive sensitivity, and 
interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & 
Critchley, 2015). Garfinkel and Critchley (2013) define interoceptive sensibility as the self-
report of bodily sensations and perceptions; interoceptive sensitivity as an objective measure 
(e.g., through cardiac awareness, described further below); and interoceptive awareness as an 
individual’s cognizance of their own interoceptive abilities (i.e., metacognition), such that this 
variable is as a ratio of an individual’s objective accuracy and their self-reported confidence in 
their perception. Emerging research supports that interoceptive sensibility, sensitivity, and 
awareness are distinct (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Meessen et al., 2016). Interoceptive sensitivity, as 
Garfinkel and colleagues define it, is commonly referred to as Interoceptive Accuracy (IA). For 
ease of presentation and consistency with previous literature, an individuals’ accurate perception 
of bodily sensations via objective measure are referred to in this manuscript as IA. Garfinkel and 
colleagues found that only IA predicted increases in the other domains of interoception; thus, 
objective measures predict subjective measures of interoception, and not the other way around. 
One of the most widely used measurements of IA is cardiac awareness, in which a 
participant is typically asked to estimate how many heartbeats they felt in a particular period of 
time (Schandry, 1981). The count is then compared to an objective measure of heartbeats 
obtained by electrocardiogram or heartrate monitor. The closer in accuracy an individual is to 
estimating their objective heart rate, the better their IA score. The implications for this 
assessment are wide, and are discussed in greater detail below. However, there are several 
limitations of this method: (a) it is limited in ecological validity since the individual is typically 
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measuring their heart rate while at rest (when it is most difficult to attend to interoceptive cues); 
(b) there is an over focus on cardiac perception leaving other modalities of interoceptive 
awareness unexplored (e.g., challenge tasks); and (c) its clinical utility has been infrequently 
explored (Khalsa & Lapidus 2016). Despite these limitations, increasing evidence supports that 
cardiac perception is an important individual difference in emotional processing (Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2016) and psychopathology (Khalsa & Lapidus 2016). High IA has been linked to 
improved cognition (Matthias, Schandry, Duschek, & Pollatos, 2009), decision making (Werner, 
Jung, Duschek, & Schandry, 2009), and therapeutic outcomes (Masdrakis et al., 2013). 
Interoception in Emotion.  
Interoception has long been found to play a key role in the experience of emotions, and 
there are ample studies demonstrating key neurological and psychological overlap in self-
reported IA and emotional experience (Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004; Craig, 
2010; Dalgleish, 2004; Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010; Herbert, Herbert, & 
Pollatos, 2011; Wiens, 2005; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012). It is well established that there is a 
role of interoception processing in the generation and recognition of emotions (Wiens, 2005), 
and that IA may be involved in the pathogenesis of a variety of psychopathologies, particularly 
mood and anxiety disorders (Domschke et al., 2010; Fustos, Gramann, Herbert, & Pollatos, 
2013; Herbert et al., 2011). More specifically, individuals with increased IA are prone to more 
frequent and intense emotional experiences and are more likely to label a physiological symptom 
as emotional than those with lower IA (Barrett et al., 2004; Craig, 2010; Schandry, 1981). 
Perhaps as a result, IA is positively associated with emotional lability (Barrett et al., 2004; 
Schandry, 1981) and anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010; Paulus & Stein, 2006). Conversely, 
decreased and/or dysfunctional IA is associated with increased depression, negative affect, and 
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alexithymia, or difficulty identifying and describing emotions (Harshaw, 2015; Herbert et al., 
2011; Paulus & Stein, 2010), though this relationship is complex (Dunn et al., 2010). It is 
suggested that individuals with dysfunctional IA are less likely to experience sensations related 
to emotion, resulting in emotional blunting while also being less likely to experience pleasurable 
sensations, resulting in anhedonia (Harshaw, 2015; Paulus & Stein, 2010). It is unclear if 
depression is cause or consequence of deficient IA: those who are depressed may have lower 
sensitivity to arousing stimuli, including hedonic stimuli, or if lower levels of IA are a risk factor 
for depression due to decreased perception of pleasure and increased perception of aversion and 
disgust (Dunn, Dalgleish, Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007; Harshaw, 2015; Paulus & Stein, 2010). 
Another complimentary possibility is that individuals with decreased IA may then become reliant 
on exteroceptive signals (e.g., achievement or social inclusion) to elicit hedonic response, 
ultimately resulting in decreased self-regulation and self-sufficiency (Harshaw, 2015; Joormann 
& Vanderlind, 2014; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).  
Some of the links between interoception and depression and anxiety may have a social 
and environmental influence. For example, gender differences in depression and anxiety begin at 
adolescence, a time when girls are socialized to attend to their body at increased frequency and 
intensity (e.g., for weight management or due to menstruation). Indeed, girls in young 
adolescence report increased pain, including headaches and abdominal pain, at increased levels 
compared to boys, and this difference extends into adulthood (Beck, J. E., 2008). Evidence has 
shown that women reported increased IA compared to men, though women’s objective cardiac 
awareness scores were significantly lower than men’s (Grabauskaite, Baranauskas, & Griskova-
Bulanova, 2017; Koch & Pollatos, 2014). As a result of increased vigilance and inaccurate 
reporting, girls and women may misinterpret bodily signals as aversive and/or associated with 
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unpleasant experiences, even if these sensations have no objective link (Harshaw, 2015; Paulus 
& Stein, 2010). Cross-culturally, Western cultures tend to de-emphasize somatic complaints 
associated with psychological distress whereas Non-Western cultures tend to have increased IA 
and are more likely to report somatic complaints when experiencing psychological distress (Ma-
Kellams, 2014). Western de-emphasis of bodily awareness has been suggested as a partial 
explanation for the higher prevalence of psychological distress in these cultures (Kirmayer & 
Ryder, 2016; Ma-Kellams, 2014).  
Electroencephalography and Emotion.  
Contemporary research methods in neuropsychology and neuroimaging have provided 
greater insight into the origin, time course, and discrete expression of emotions and cognition. 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) have been particularly 
useful tools in better understanding the neural processing of stimuli across populations largely 
due to their non-invasiveness, cost effectiveness, and high temporal resolution (Luck, 2014). 
When averaged together, particular ERP waveforms, referred to as components, provide data on 
the time course, intensity, and possible location of neural responses to an event, stimulus, or 
response (Fabiani, Gratton, & Coles, 2000). Components are the central data points for most 
ERP studies. The nomenclature and taxonomy of most components reflect either, or both, their 
temporal expression and polar direction. For example, the “P100” or “P1” is both the first 
positive-going deflection after a stimulus, and is also generally observed at around 100ms, while 
the “N100” or “N1” occurs immediately thereafter in a negative direction (Earls, Curran, & 
Mittal, 2016; Luck, 2014). The most commonly examined components within research on 
emotion and attention are the P300 and Late Positive Potential (LPP) (Hajcak, MacNamara, & 
Olvet, 2010), though the N1, P1, and numerous others have also received a sizable amount of 
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interest in the literature (Citron, 2012; Earls et al., 2016; Ferreira-Santos et al., 2012; Hajcak et 
al., 2010; Mingtian, Xiongzhao, Jinyao, Shuqiao, & Atchley, 2011).  
The P300 (sometimes referred to as the P3) is the third pronounced positive deflection in 
a typical ERP waveform, peaking at around 300-500ms after stimulus onset, though the precise 
time and duration of the component varies (Luck, 2014; Picton, 1992; Polich, 2007). Amplitude, 
latency, and duration of the P300 is influenced by introspection, personal relevance of stimuli, 
and/or executive functioning capacity of the participant (e.g., working memory, attention; 
described further below) (Hajcak et al., 2010; Picton, 1992; Polich, 2007). The P300 is most 
clearly elicited when a rare target stimulus is encountered after a sequence of frequent, non-
target stimuli as response requires updated working memory (i.e., “context updating”), which is a 
key component of cognitive control (discussed further below) (Polich, 2007). The P300 is further 
divided into two additional components: the P3a is recorded in anterior electrodes, likely 
corresponding to Cingulate Cortex; the P3b is generated in temporoparietal electrodes, likely 
reflecting greater spread of neural activity, including limbic and broader frontal lobe activation 
(Polich, 2007; Volpe et al., 2007). In healthy individuals, the P300 is enhanced by emotionally 
arousing stimuli, particularly if the stimuli are personally relevant, but not the P3a, suggesting 
the P3b reflects recruitment of neural resources intended to evaluate motivational salience (i.e., 
approach or avoid systems) (Delplanque, Silvert, Hot, & Sequeira, 2005). The generators of the 
P3a and P3b have not yet been fully established, and the discreet functioning of the components 
is not yet fully understood (Linden, 2005). For the purposes of this study, the P3b is what is 
referenced when discussing the P300. 
Emotional stimuli, particularly negative emotional stimuli, have been found to generate 
larger P300 amplitudes reflecting “motivated attention,” wherein the stimulus reflects a 
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motivationally salient response, such as threat to be avoided or reward to be sought (Delplanque 
et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2010). Some have suggested that there is a stronger bias toward 
positive information than negative information, or that emotional information has an equal 
degree of bias regardless of valence (Carretie et al., 2008; Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & 
Chartrand, 2003; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006). Research indicates that the P300 also provides 
evidence for a bias toward negative interpersonal information, such as facial expressions (Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004). Moreover, other findings suggest that the P300 and 
LPP show biases less to valence, but more to the personal relevance of a stimulus that generates 
a larger P300 while the state- and trait-level emotions of the participant then dictate its amplitude 
(Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 
2006; Nakao, Takezawa, Shiraishi, & Miyatani, 2009). Thus, the perception of threat or 
pleasantness within stimuli may be reliant on the perception of self-relevance by the participant.  
Interoception and Electroencephalography 
The attentional biases described above are enhanced in individuals with high IA 
(Domschke et al., 2010; Pollatos, Kirsch, & Schandry, 2005). Those with increased IA show 
larger P300 amplitudes to emotional stimuli regardless of valence (Herbert, Pollatos, & 
Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, Matthias, & Schandry, 2007). Compared to individuals with lower 
levels of IA, individuals with high IA have been shown to be more sensitive to emotional stimuli 
in a variety of modalities, regardless of psychopathology (Herbert, Pollatos, Flor, Enck, & 
Schandry, 2010; Pollatos et al., 2005; Werner, Peres, Duschek, & Schandry, 2010). These biases 
were compounded when stimuli contained an element of the body (e.g., ugly) compared to when 
they did not (e.g., stupid), suggesting not only a bias to emotional and threatening stimuli, but to 
stimuli referring to the body itself (Benau & Atchley, Under Review).  
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The mechanisms of the association between IA and sensitivity to emotional stimuli are 
only starting to be understood. The neural systems associated with P300 activation are also 
associated with those that are involved in IA (Herbert et al., 2007; Pollatos et al., 2007). Pollatos 
et al. (2005) suggest that individuals with higher IA have heightened neural connections and 
reactivity in brain regions, namely the insula, associated both with emotional perception and 
visceral perception. One proposed mechanism for this link is that individuals with heightened IA 
may find that physiological reactions (e.g., increased heart rate) in certain situations (e.g., 
exposure to a phobic stimulus) and they may find their experiences to be much more unpleasant 
than those with lower IA (Critchley et al., 2004; Wiens, 2005). As a result of these associations, 
the mounting evidence investigating IA support the theory of James (1884), that emotional 
experience is contingent and secondary to bodily sensations. Thus, individuals with heightened 
IA are more likely to perceive their bodily signals (particularly heartbeats), increasing the 
likelihood of experiencing threat, resulting in increased frequency and intensity of major 
negative emotions such as fear and anxiety (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016; Paulus, 2015; Paulus & 
Stein, 2006, 2010; Stern, 2014).  
Interestingly, those with higher IA have also been found to be able to reappraise 
emotional stimuli following training to do so, despite having greater reactivity to those stimuli 
prior to training (Fustos et al., 2013). The comparatively speedier reappraisal is suggested to be a 
result of a sensitivity to the underlying hyperactive somatosensory inputs in that population 
(Fustos et al., 2013; Herbert et al., 2011). The results of Fustos and colleagues suggest that those 
with increased IA are not only more likely to experience heightened emotions, but also have 
increased top-down abilities to regulate them.  
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Cognition and Emotion 
In addition to, and in conjunction with, the role of bodily sensations, cognitive function 
itself is a key contributor to the experience of emotions (Critchley, Eccles, & Garfinkel, 2013; 
Uddin, Kinnison, Pessoa, & Anderson, 2014). Initially framed as peripheral to each other, the 
interaction of cognition with mood and pathology are becoming increasingly important and 
informative avenues of research (Critchley et al., 2013; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). The evidence 
supports the postulation that emotion is both a bottom-up and top-down mechanism: while a 
stimulus may trigger bodily sensations that correspond to emotions in some capacity, humans 
can modify their perception of, and reaction to, those stimuli cognitively or behaviorally (Banich 
et al., 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Better understanding the mechanisms of these processes, 
and what is and is not able to be consciously manipulated, can lead to improved targeted 
treatments (Bowie, Gupta, & Holshausen, 2013; Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007; Wykes & 
Spaulding, 2011). However, before these interventions can be implemented effectively, there is 
still much more research needed to understand basic cognitive processes, and their interaction 
with emotional experience and pathology (Koziol, Barker, & Jansons, 2015; Snyder, Miyake, & 
Hankin, 2015; Suchy, 2009). 
The role of attention as an executive function (discussed further below) has been the most 
consistent target of research in pathology and emotion (Banich et al., 2009; Heeren, Billieux, 
Philippot, & Maurage, 2015; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Snyder et al., 2015). An assumption of 
research pertaining to cognitive function and emotion is that, barring intervention, attentional 
biases are reflexive and involuntary means of giving preference for particular stimuli to enter 
consciousness (Cisler & Koster, 2010). It has been suggested that humans are particularly 
sensitive to threatening and negative stimuli (Carretie, Albert, Lopez-Martin, & Tapia, 2009), but 
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it may be that humans may be sensitive to emotional stimuli in general (Schupp, Flaisch, 
Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006; Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). A bias to negative attention may 
be adaptive in that it evaluates threat; however, excessive biases to these stimuli can be 
deleterious (Mehu & Scherer, 2015; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010; Van Bockstaele et al., 
2014). Early cognitive models suggested that excessive attentional biases to negative information 
are learned through development and are a primary risk factor for mental illness, particularly 
mood disorders (Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010).  
Attentional biases are proposed to be composed of three characteristics: (a) difficulty 
with disengagement; (b) facilitated and/or automatic attention to a particular stimulus; and (c) 
avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Difficulty with disengagement is the inability to deflect 
attention from a stimulus. Facilitated engagement is reflexively attending to aversive stimuli. 
Avoidance is an inability to engage with stimulus that is typically viewed as aversive or 
threatening stimulus (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Exhibiting an attentional bias to aversive or 
otherwise affective stimuli is not necessarily problematic, while the appraisal associated with the 
bias is. For example, those with mood disorders often exhibit comparable attentional biases to 
negative stimuli as healthy controls, but those with depression are likely to exhibit greater 
affective responses than controls (Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014; Mehu & Scherer, 2015).  
Attention may be under more voluntary control than initially proposed (Diamond, 2013). 
Attention is part of a broader network of cognitive functions broadly called executive 
functioning, which is primarily involved in goal pursuit, planning, and activity completion 
(Banich et al., 2009; Bunge, 2004; Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). The consequences of 
maladaptive executive functioning can be profound and are associated with a variety of cognitive 
and emotional difficulties. Deficits in executive functioning result in increased cognitive rigidity 
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and perseveration (Dreisbach, 2012) and are associated with distress-proneness (Mehu & 
Scherer, 2015), negative affect (Pe, Raes, & Kuppens, 2013), and a variety of psychopathologies 
(Banich et al., 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ravizza & Salo, 2014). A proposed mechanism for 
this association is that individuals with decreased executive functioning are less able to 
disengage attention mechanisms from negative stimuli and then engage with positive stimuli 
(Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 2012; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). 
Attention is broadly defined as the mechanism wherein information is selected to remain in 
consciousness and/or stored in memory (Posner & Snyder, 2004), though there is some debate 
about attention’s composition and precise placement in the hierarchy of cognition (Koziol et al., 
2015; Petersen & Posner, 2012). Some have suggested that there is limited consensus on the 
definition of attention “since everyone knows what [it] is” (Ridderinkhof & van der Stelt, 2000), 
and, as a result, there is limited research into defining and understanding attention. Some have 
argued that attention is not a unitary construct, and it is often defined as whatever the dependent 
variable is within a particular study (Parasuraman & Yantis, 1998; Plude, Enns, & Brodeur, 
1994). An initial proposal suggested that there were three main processes underlying attention: 
alerting, orienting, and executive (Posner & Dehaene, 1994; Posner & Petersen, 1989). Alerting 
is the basic element of arousal wherein a stimulus enters sensory input and the requisite 
neuroanatomical structures are activated to engage the other systems. Orienting is the process by 
which resources are allocated to maintain awareness of the stimulus. The third system, the 
executive, was thought to control focus on stimuli.  
Updates to the model of attention discussed above suggest that, based on decades of human 
and non-human neurobiological and neuropsychological research, in fact, the executive aspect of 
attention is more likely a top-down mechanism, driven by functions and modalities both within, 
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and outside of, attention (Petersen & Posner, 2012). Initially framed as subordinate to attention, a 
substantial body of research suggests that executive control is the dominant system that utilizes 
attentional resources to match a stimulus and/or response to an expected template; matching that 
template corresponds to continued engagement in that task, whereas mismatch corresponds to 
changing of strategy and behavior in order to facilitate attention (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick & Cohen, 2014). For example, in a typical Eriksen flanker 
task, in which the participant is to identify the direction of a central arrow in a row of arrows, 
should the participant make an error, the participant is more than likely to attempt to correct that 
error and slow their responses on subsequent trials (Carter & Krug, 2011). 
Heightened salience and attentional capture of emotional stimuli is essential for survival. 
Increased threat detection corresponds to increased likelihood to respond to threat; however, 
excessive focus on emotional stimuli can be deleterious, particularly in contemporary 
industrialized environments (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Watkins & Brown, 
2002). Excessive focus on negative stimuli has been found to be associated with a variety of 
psychopathologies, chiefly depression and anxiety, and has been identified as a risk factor and 
endophenotype for the onset and maintenance of those disorders (Meiran, Diamond, Toder, & 
Nemets, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Pe et al., 2013; Rock, Roiser, 
Riedel, & Blackwell, 2013; Snyder, 2013). When targeted in treatment, deficits in attention have 
shown improvement alongside symptom reduction (Siegle, 2011; Sole et al., 2015; Wykes & 
Spaulding, 2011). However, far more research is needed into the mechanisms and underpinnings 
of attentional biases to enhance their effectiveness in treatment. 
The Attentional Blink. The Attentional Blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is 
one of the most popular paradigms to assess the temporal dynamics of attention (Dux & Marois, 
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2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010; McHugo, Olatunji, & Zald, 2013). In a typical AB paradigm, the 
participant is presented with a series of stimuli in a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) 
stream. In this stream, about 20 stimuli are presented for a fleeting duration (typically less than 
100ms). The participant is asked to identify the first target (T1) and a second target (T2), that are 
unique to the rest of the stimuli in some way. Usually, the targets are simple symbols, such as 
letters, while the remaining filler stimuli are of some other type, such as numbers. The 
participant is then told to recall the number of targets they saw (some trials have one or no 
targets in it) and what those targets were. The T2 is also presented at different time points in the 
stream ranging from immediately after the T1 (referred to as “Lag1”), one stimulus away 
(“Lag2”), two stimuli (“Lag3”), and so on. What has been found is that there is a window of time 
after T1 in which recalling the correct stimuli reduces substantially. Interestingly, Lag1 is usually 
recalled at better rates than L2 and Lag3. In other words, for several hundred milliseconds, the 
capacity of the brain to encode stimuli “blinks” after the presentation of an initial stimulus 
(Martens & Wyble, 2010). 
The mechanisms and origins of the AB are controversial topics. It is beyond the scope and 
purpose of this paper to provide a thorough discussion of the different hypotheses that have been 
proposed (for reviews, see: Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010). However, the main 
models of the AB can be understood in two larger themes: (a) a depletion of attentional resources 
at the onset of T1 that began with the onset of the stream of stimuli; or (b) AB reflects a 
modification of cognitive control needed to reorient attention and is unable to do so due to the 
processes involved in attending to, and encoding, T1 (Dux & Marois, 2009) . Some suggest these 
themes are not mutually exclusive, and there is evidence that both occur simultaneously 
(Kawahara, Enns, & Di Lollo, 2006). A final model, the “Boost and Bounce” model, suggests 
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that the AB occurs because the perception of T1 enhances attention to immediately-subsequent 
stimuli, and the blink occurs when working memory sources are over-fixated on filtering out 
other stimuli (Olivers, 2010). Hence, when T2 immediately succeeds T1 (Lag1), it is typically 
not blinked, but it is blinked when T2 is at Lag2. The filtering sources continue to be “boosted” 
from having seen T1, but “bounce” to baseline following a non-target immediately succeeding 
T1 (Lunau & Olivers, 2010; Olivers, 2010). Primary evidence for this comes three- and four-
target conditions wherein the blink does not occur if all three targets occur after each other, but 
the blink does occur if a distracter occurs between (or after) any of the targets (Asplund, Todd, 
Snyder, Gilbert, & Marois, 2010; Di Lollo, Kawahara, Shahab Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005; 
Kawahara et al., 2006; Most, Smith, Cooter, Levy, & Zald, 2007; Olivers, van der Stigchel, & 
Hulleman, 2007).  
Reducing an over-focus on T2 also attenuates the blink, supporting the Boost and Bounce 
model. When attentional resources are diffused by way of distraction the blink effect has been 
found to reduce considerably (Arend, Johnston, & Shapiro, 2006), as does adding a blank-screen 
delay between T1 and Lag1 (Brisson & Bourassa, 2014). However, others have found that 
distraction is more of a selective process, as some distractors reduce AB (i.e., task-irrelevant 
stimuli improve performance while task-relevant distractors do not), and some are a matter of 
individual difference (i.e., habitual blinkers will do worse, while habitual non-blinkers will do 
better) (Dux & Marois, 2008; Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002; Martens & Valchev, 2009). Finally, 
when a distractor is emotional, it enhances the attentional blink (Asplund et al., 2010; Kennedy 
& Most, 2015; Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005a; Most & Jungé, 2008; Most et al., 2007; 
Yiend, 2010). 
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The extant research examining individual differences in the AB have found somewhat 
paradoxical results compared to standard experimental psychology paradigms. Those in more 
negative moods, those with depression, and/or who those who are not motivated to perform well 
on the AB task will perform better than those who are in positive moods and/or are incentivized 
to perform well on the AB task (Arend & Botella, 2002; Biggs, Adamo, & Mitroff, 2015; Di 
Lollo et al., 2005; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010; 
McHugo et al., 2013; Rokke, Arnell, Koch, & Andrews, 2002). For example, dysphoric 
undergraduates who were presented a negative word as their T1 were less likely to identify a 
neutral T2 than controls, suggesting that dysphoria enhances the effect of either attentional 
depletion or increased sensory gaiting that underlies the AB (Koster, De Raedt, Verschuere, 
Tibboel, & De Jong, 2009). It is thought that individuals who have a higher level of engagement 
in the task are more likely to expend their attentional resources on T1 and have a longer 
refractory period than those who are less engaged (Martens & Wyble, 2010; Taatgen, Juvina, 
Schipper, Borst, & Martens, 2009). Another suggestion is that individuals who are less prone to 
blink have a wider area of attentional focus or perhaps have improved verbal abilities allowing 
them to encode T1 faster and not “blink” at T2 (Willems, Wierda, van Viegen, & Martens, 
2013). 
Stimuli in a typical AB task are usually simple symbols that are distinguished on some 
surface feature, for example, identifying a red symbol in a gray stream of symbols, and/or 
identifying a letter in a stream of numbers. However, lexical stimuli have also been used to 
explore the AB. For example, when words were used in a stream of random symbols and letters, 
words that belonged to a similar semantic category (e.g., thunder and lightning) were blinked at a 
greater rate than those from different categories (e.g., thunder and ankle) (Tibboel, De Houwer, 
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Spruyt, & Crombez, 2011). Similar effects were found using pictures. The N400, which is 
typically larger in cases of semantic incongruity, was larger for two words that were unrelated 
(e.g., doctor/flower) than for words that were related (e.g., doctor/nurse), regardless of correct 
recall of the words (Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Rolke, Heil, Streb, & Hennighausen, 2001; 
Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). Similarly, target images that were conceptually similar had 
impaired accuracy compared to target images that were conceptually distinct (i.e., same color, 
different content), suggesting that conceptual binding is a component of the AB process 
(Einhauser, Koch, & Makeig, 2007; Most et al., 2001; Wyble, Folk, & Potter, 2013). A 
comparable effect was shown for neutral faces of the same person compared to objects of the 
same color (Harris, McMahon, & Woldorff, 2013). Additional studies have shown that more 
complex T1 (e.g., words with additional syllables, shapes with more dimensions to identify), T1 
enhance the blink, whereas simpler T1 stimuli reduce the blink magnitude (Dux & Marois, 
2009).  
The valence and emotional content of stimuli is also an important factor in the AB (McHugo 
et al., 2013; Yiend, 2010). Aversive T1 stimuli increase the AB, while an aversive T2 attenuates 
the blink regardless of T1 content, though this effect is greater for pictures than for words 
(Anderson, 2005; McHugo et al., 2013; Schwabe et al., 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2010). Words 
and names that convey power at T1 enhance the blink for men (e.g., boss or the idiographic name 
of their superior), but not for women, compared to neutral words (Mason, Zhang, & Dyer, 2010). 
The hypothesis for this effect, dubbed the Emotional Attentional Blink, is that content of stimuli 
that are emotional and/or arousing will increase attentional capture and “break through” 
whatever filtering mechanism may underlie the AB (McHugo et al., 2013). Further evidence of 
this is provided by individuals with anxious pathology associated with increased baseline 
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hypervigilance (e.g., Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder) who show comparatively minimal blinks when T2 stimuli are 
emotional compared to when they are neutral; they generally do not differ from non-anxious 
controls when T2 stimuli are neutral (McHugo et al., 2013; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the content of the stimuli for the AB paradigm is as important as the surface features 
of the targets and the individual differences of the participants. 
Interoception and Attention. There is little research regarding the role of interoception 
and basic attentional functioning. In fact, the authors of a recent review stated they were unaware 
of any studies that explored attention and interoceptive processes, specifically (Paulus & Stewart, 
2014, p. 344). However, there are a few studies that can offer insight into how IA influences, or 
is influenced by, attention. In a test of attention, individuals with higher IA performed better in 
tests of selective and divided attention (Matthias et al., 2009). They also were better attuned at 
identifying a number of external physical signals, including external discrimination of audible, 
non-linguistic tones; this difference was enhanced after a training for high perceivers only 
(Katkin, Morell, Goldband, Bernstein, & Wise, 1982). Thus, individuals with increased IA have 
increases in attention to other external stimuli, which may reduce bias and increase focus on 
task-related demands (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Garfinkel & Critchley, 
2013). When assessed using retrospective data, there was no association between IA and 
metacognition and memory (Meessen et al., 2016). Meessen and colleagues attained their 
information regarding cognitive functioning using retrospective data on cognition, and 
prospective data on interoception by using a heartbeat detection task. Therefore, it is unclear to 
what degree their null findings are based on errors in self-report. Similarly, Garfinkel et al. 
(2015) also reported a series of null findings in correlating self-reported interoception abilities to 
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self-reported cognitive strengths. Therefore, when it comes to experimentally investigating the 
role of interoception in emotion and cognition, it is important to distinguish interoceptive 
accuracy (data attained prospectively) and interoceptive awareness (data obtained by self-report) 
(Garfinkel et al., 2015).  
One way that interoception and executive functioning have been compared and/or 
experimentally manipulated is through training in mindfulness, or the non-judgmental awareness 
of events, space, and time (Holzel et al., 2011). Those who are engage in mindfulness-based 
training often report increased IA compared to those who do not (Tang, Holzel, & Posner, 2015). 
Individuals who are naïve to mindfulness training have exhibited increased IA following 
mindfulness training (Bornemann & Singer, 2017; Farb, Segal, & Anderson, 2013); however, 
others did not find the link between mindfulness and IA following mindfulness based stress 
reduction training (Parkin et al., 2013). Time perception, which is a confluence of multiple 
components of executive functioning, particularly attention (Brown, 2006; Zakay & Block, 
2004), is positively associated with IA (Merchant, Harrington, & Meck, 2013; Pollatos, 
Laubrock, & Wittmann, 2014; Wittmann, 2013). Attention and other executive functions have 
been found to predict self- and emotion-regulation (Bernier, Carlson, & Whipple, 2010; 
Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012), yet it inconsistently predicts distress tolerance, an 
index of IA (Sutterlin et al., 2013a).  
Interoception and the Attention Blink. There is little research that explores the role of 
interoception in the AB. In an emotional AB paradigm, in which target words were affective 
(e.g., “murder”) in a stream of neutral words (e.g., “supergalaxy”), Garfinkel et al. (2013) found 
that IA positively correlated with recall accuracy, with the largest r corresponding to memory for 
positive words. Interestingly, the authors only found this association when participants’ heart 
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was in systole; no associations were found when participants’ hearts were in diastole. Similarly, 
in an fMRI study, Garfinkel et al. (2014) found that the processing of sad faces, specifically, 
were recalled better in an AB paradigm when the faces were presented at systole than at diastole. 
The authors also found that the ratings of the faces’ intensity were greater at systole than at 
diastole. Results of the fMRI data indicate heightened amygdala and hippocampus activity 
during systole at the time of fearful –and only fearful - face presentation. However, to my 
knowledge, those are the only two studies at present that have investigated individual differences 
in IA as they relate to the AB. Although they did not directly measure IA, Kever, Pollatos, 
Vermeulen, and Grynberg (2015b) manipulated physical arousal of their participants prior to 
completing an EAB task: half of their sample engaged in an exercise task (7.5 minutes of intense 
stationary cycling while maintaining a heart rate of 220 BPM) for the high-arousal condition, and 
the other half engaged in 7.5 minutes of relaxation (reclined in an armchair while listening to 
relaxing music) for the low-arousal condition. Kevar and colleagues found that those in the high 
arousal condition had a significantly attenuated blink for emotional stimuli compared to the 
relaxed condition. Thus, these studies highlight a key role in somatic signals in attentional bias to 
emotional stimuli. 
EEG studies of the Attentional Blink.  
The use of EEG has elucidated the time course and mechanisms of the AB. Due to the 
nature of the task involving working memory updating and attentional allocation, the P3b is 
typically what is assessed as the P3a is more anterior and is not generally seen to fluctuate in any 
condition of the AB (Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005). For ease of presentation, since studies 
of electrophysiological correlates vary in their terminology of the component, it will be referred 
to as the “P300,” despite this being a non-ideal nomenclature. Typically, the P300 is attenuated 
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in trials in which the T2 was not detected (i.e., the blink) (Kranczioch, Debener, & Engel, 2003; 
Vogel et al., 1998). The P300 amplitude and peak latency also increase as a function of Lag and, 
therefore, Blink likelihood: when T2 was detected, Lag2 corresponded to the smallest P300, 
followed by Lag1 and then Lag8, while when T2 was missed, the P300 was comparable across 
lags (Kranczioch et al., 2003; Martens, Munneke, Smid, & Johnson, 2006b; Sessa, Luria, 
Verleger, & Dell'Acqua, 2007). However, the role of the P300 may be more complicated as the 
P300 does not always correspond to T2 accuracy, particularly at the later Lags, which are 
considered outside the Blink window (Batterink, Karns, & Neville, 2012). Therefore, the P300 
and the psychological processes that underlie it are important components of the Blink, but there 
are additional aspects of the process that are important to consider. 
 Vogel and colleagues, found an attenuated P2, while early components related to 
attentional orientation (e.g., N1, P1) were not attenuated; this indicates that the T2 was seen, but 
not encoded sufficiently in memory. More recent research, however, indicates that the P2 is not 
suppressed (Kranczioch et al., 2003; Martens & Valchev, 2009). The function of the P2 is not 
well-established, but it is thought that the P200 corresponds to updating (i.e., an index of the 
executive component of attention) while the P300 corresponds to encoding of information (Zhao, 
Zhou, & Fu, 2013). Supporting the so-called “Bump and Boost” model of the AB (Olivers, 
2010), the peak amplitude of the P300 to T1 has been significantly correlated to the P300 to 
individual differences in blink magnitude (Shapiro, Schmitz, Martens, Hommel, & Schnitzler, 
2006). In other words, Shapiro and colleagues found that the propensity for an individual to blink 
was determined by resource allocation to the encoding of T1. When the masking effect of the 
stimulus in Lag1 is removed by adding a blank screen between T1 and the next stimulus, the 
P300 significantly increases (Brisson & Bourassa, 2014). In the lead up to a T1, event-related 
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alpha desynchronization was negatively associated with T2 ultimately not being encoded; in 
other words, increased anticipatory neuroelectrical activity to T1 corresponded to decreased 
activity (Maclean & Arnell, 2011). Individuals who are less prone to blink are shown to have a, 
smaller earlier P300 to T1,  therefore they are able to diffuse their attention and/or consolidate 
and encode the stimuli into memory faster and more efficiently (Martens et al., 2006b).  
Current Research 
The overarching goal of the present study is to further elucidate how IA may impact the 
time course and intensity of attentional biases to emotional stimuli. It is clear that there is a 
mutual influence of interoception and attention and emotional experiences. However, few studies 
have examined individual differences in interoception so as to predict the modulation of 
attentional function during the processing of emotional stimuli. More specifically, there is a 
dearth of studies that have utilized the AB to explore individual differences of attentional bias to 
emotional stimuli as a function of IA. No study could be found that has combined these variables 
using EEG to measure the time course of these attentional biases in brain and mind. More 
specific aims and goals of the present research are discussed further below. 
Aim 1. The present study aims to significantly extend previous work exploring the 
Emotional Attention Blink. In addition, several important replications are expected. Previous 
work infrequently has utilized lexical stimuli in an AB paradigm, and fewer have used words that 
were emotional compared to neutral words. In studies that have utilized emotional stimuli in an 
AB — either pictorial or lexical — a consistent finding is that emotional stimuli at T2 attenuates 
the blink, regardless of T1 content or Lag (McHugo et al., 2013). This will be seen in the present 
study by showing fewer blinks at all conditions with an affective T2. To my knowledge, no study 
has explored this phenomenon using EEG. In accordance to fewer blinks to affective T2, P300 
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amplitude to emotional T2 stimuli will significantly larger than neutral T2 stimuli. Novel to the 
present study is modifying the content T1 stimuli. No previous research could be found that has 
included both neutral and emotional T1 stimuli. If the Boost and Bounce hypothesis is correct, 
affective T1 stimuli should enhance attentional priming for emotional T2 and reduce the blink, 
particularly if T2 is affective. A final replication in the present study will be that the P300 
amplitude to T1 stimuli will negatively correlate with the amplitude to T2; these correlations will 
be calculated within each of the four trial types. 
Aim 2. The second aim of this study is to explore the influence of interoception on 
attention and memory specifically in an AB paradigm. While there is sufficient behavioral and 
neuroimaging evidence to suggest that IA is positively related to attention to emotional stimuli 
and emotional experiences (Barrett et al., 2004; Benau & Atchley, Under Review; Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2016; Herbert et al., 2010; Werner et al., 2010), the time course and sensitivity of 
these associations are not fully explored. Specifically, no study to date has examined individual 
differences in IA as predictive of AB magnitude or the EEG response to an AB paradigm. 
Therefore, the present study will examine if improved IA, in general, will increase vigilance in 
an AB paradigm. Additionally, while it is predicted that an affective T2 will correspond to a 
reduced blink and larger P300 amplitude, those with higher IA should have a further reduction in 
blink magnitude and increased P300 amplitude, respectively. It is expected that these effects will 
be seen independent of measures of anxiety and depression. 
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Methods 
Participants. A total of 39 self-selected participants (21 women) completed the study in 
exchange for course credit or $20 payment (n = 4) 1. Participants were recruited from the 
University of Kansas participant pool and were 17-31 years old (M = 19.0, SD = 2.32). By self-
report, all participants were native speakers of English and had no history of traumatic brain 
injury or major psychopathology, including current depression (all Beck Depression Inventory 
scores < 13).  
Procedure. Upon arrival to the lab, participants completed informed consent procedures, 
demographic questionnaires, and a Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI) (Beck, A. T., Steer, & 
Brown, 1996). Participants were then instructed on how to apply the heart rate monitor on their 
sternum and were offered a private room to apply the monitor. After the heart rate monitor was 
applied, a trained researcher conducted the cardiac awareness task. After the cardiac awareness 
task, participants were fitted with EEG equipment prior to completing the AB task. After task 
completion, participants were debriefed on the nature and purpose of the task. Each of these 
steps are described in further detail below. All procedures were approved by the Institutional 
Review Board at the University of Kansas. 
Cardiac Apparatus and Awareness Task. In the cardiac awareness task, participants 
were asked to count their heartbeats for a given time. After the heart rate monitor was applied, a 
trained researcher then conducted the cardiac awareness task. Participants were told to keep their 
hands by their sides and not take their pulse and to inform the researcher when they were ready 
 
1 17 of the average perceivers, and 12 of the high perceivers were recruited in Fall of 2016 and the remainder were 
recruited in Spring of 2017 (described below). After attaining 19 average perceivers, we proceeded to screen for 
high perceivers. Approximately 20 additional participants completed the cardiac awareness task and were identified 
as average perceivers and, thus, were excluded from this study and completed an unrelated task. High perceivers 
were given an opportunity to complete an unrelated task for credit and then return to the lab for payment, or to 
complete the present task only for credit. This method was approved by the Institutional Review Board. 
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to begin. Participants were asked to count their heartbeats for three rounds of 25s, 35s, and 45s. 
At the end of each round, they were asked how many heartbeats occurred. This number was 
compared to their actual heart rate. After the cardiac awareness task, participants removed the 
heart rate monitor and were offered privacy to do so. Cardiac awareness scores are calculated as 
the average of the error in perceiving heartbeats over three trials of  the three intervals [1/3 ∑ [1 - 
(|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats| / recorded heart - beats)], and scores ≥ 0.85 (i.e., 85% 
accurate) are considered “high perceivers” while all others are considered “average perceivers.” 
The test and its requisite cut score has been validated numerous times to classify high IA and 
average IA (Herbert et al., 2010; Herbert et al., 2007; Matthias et al., 2009; Pollatos et al., 2005; 
Schandry, 1981). Importantly, the group of “average” perceivers should not be confused with 
“poor” perceivers, who have been identified as being notably poor at the task, which may be 
predictive of alexithymia and depression (Furman, Waugh, Bhattacharjee, Thompson, & Gotlib, 
2013). The present “average” perceivers, on the other hand, have a wide distribution of scores 
(see Figure 1).  
AB task. After the heart rate monitor was removed, participants moved to the EEG lab 
and sat in a comfortable chair while being fitted with an EEG cap. Once the EEG was set up, 
participants were provided AB task instructions. Participants were shown a rapid stream of 
stimuli that were 5-8 characters in length. Each trial began with a fixation cross that is presented 
for 1500ms. Each stimulus in the stream was presented for 100ms. Filler, non-word, non-target 
stimuli were a mix of letters, numbers, blank spaces, and symbols. Within a dual-target 
condition, the participant saw an initial target word (T1) as the fifth item in the stream. Followed 
by a second target (T2) at one of three “lags”: Lag1 (immediately after the T1; no inter-stimulus 
  27 
interval), Lag 2 (with one intervening distractor stimulus; 100ms delay), and Lag 8 (seven 
intervening stimuli; 700ms delay).  
Forty trials contained a T1 but no T2 (i.e. single-target condition). Half of the single-
target trials had a neutral target and the other half had an affective target. Forty of the trials 
contained no targets. No trial contained a T2 without a T1. Of the dual-target trials, there were 20 
trials per lag of: affective T1 and T2 (AA), an affective T1 and neutral T2 (AN), a neutral T1 and 
affective T2 (NA), a neutral T1 and T2 (NN). Thus, in total, there were 60 trials each of AA, 
AN, NA, and NN across each of the three lags (20 trials per condition per lag), 40 single-target 
trials (20 neutral, 20 affective), and 40 no-target conditions for a total of 320 trials.  
At the end of each trial, the participant was asked how many words they saw. They were 
only able to press 0, 1, or 2 followed by the Enter key. If they indicated they saw at least one 
word, they were asked to recall the word or words (in order) by typing it into the program, 
followed by Enter. They were then presented with an indication that the next trial is to begin. 
The screen between trials was untimed, allowing for the participant to have a self-paced break if. 
Three times in the task, participants were made to pause for one minute to complete 
questionnaires and to prevent fatigue and disengagement from the task. Figure 2 presents a 
schematic and overview of the task. The task took about an hour. 
Stimuli. Thirty unique affective and neutral stimuli, respectively, were taken from the 
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999)2. All words were 
between five and seven characters in length. Based on the ANEW ratings, affective words were 
rated as significantly more negative [t (32.33) = 35.82, p < .001] and more arousing [t (45.59) = 
9.42, p < .001] than neutral words. Neutral words were ranked as somewhat more frequent (M = 
 
2 Affective words: 100, 195, 8, 1, 398, 188, 591, 92, 465, 60, 37, 188, 244, 285, 879, 202, 319, 8, 419, 178, 445, 
368, 322, 156, 447, 10, 197, 679, 601, 392; Neutral words: 66, 1020, 737, 688, 283, 936, 303, 426, 638, 651, 695, 
995, 850, 129, 148, 832, 309, 412, 568, 564, 675, 855, 828, 1024, 84, 208, 991, 547, 951, 724. 
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68.0, SD = 82.39) than affective stimuli [M = 30.7, SD = 50.41, t (48.05) = 2.12, p = .040, d = 
0.61]. Previous research has found that minor fluctuations in word frequency likely makes little 
impact in an emotional AB (Anderson, 2005). All stimuli were presented in upper case black 
Courier New size 18 font on gray background on an LCD screen. Stimuli were presented using 
e-Prime Version 2.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA).  
Apparatus and data preparation 
Cardiac Data. Cardiac data was collected using Polar V800 heart rate monitor (Polar 
Electro Oy, Kempele, Finland). The sum of inter-beat intervals (i.e. R-R intervals) was compared 
to the participant’s estimation of the number of beats that were measured. The use of a Polar 
V800 heart rate monitor for peak-to-peak counts of heartbeats and beats per minute, in lieu of a 
comprehensive electrocardiogram, has been validated in previous studies in humans (Board, 
Ispoglous, & Ingle, 2016; Giles, Draper, & Neil, 2015).  
Electroencephalography. All EEG equipment and software was developed and 
manufactured by Compumedics Neuroscan (Charlotte, NC). EEG was collected via 36 electrodes 
mounted in an elastic cap (QuikCap 40) according to the International 10-20 system. Data was 
recorded using a NuAmps40 amplifier. Additional electrodes were placed above and below the 
left eye to record vertical artifact and two additional electrodes were placed next to the outer 
canthi (outer part of the eye) to monitor ocular movement. All impedances were kept below 
10kΩ. Data was digitized at 1kHz. Offline, EEG data were filtered using a .01-30hz bandpass 
filter and were re-re-referenced to linked mastoid electrodes. Data were collected and analyzed 
using Curry 7.0.10 software. Artifacts were corrected using the proprietary covariance procedure 
within our software based on the methods of Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). Trials 
containing artifact that exceeded ±70 µV after correction were automatically removed. As a final 
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step, each trial containing excess artifact that was not corrected or removed in the previous steps 
(e.g., Alpha-wave intrusion) was removed. The waveforms included a 400ms pre-T1 baseline 
and were extended for 1.6s after T1 (Keil, Ihssen, & Heim, 2006; Martens, Elmallah, London, & 
Johnson, 2006a). There were ≥ 15 usable trials in each condition for each participant in the 
included dataset.	
Data reduction and analysis 
The number of blinks (i.e., there were two stimuli presented but the participant reported 
seeing just one) were entered into a 2 (group: high vs. average perceivers) X 2 (T1 Valence: 
neutral vs. affect) X 2 (T2 Valence: neutral vs. affective) X 3 (lags 1, 2, and 8) mixed-model 
repeated measures ANOVA. Single-target conditions, containing a T1 but no T2, were entered 
into a 2 (group: high vs. average perceivers) X 2 (Valence: neutral vs. affect) mixed-model 
repeated measures ANOVA. The temporal proximity of T1 and T2 in Lag1 make it nearly 
impossible to distinguish EEG data from the targets and, therefore, P300 amplitude was assessed 
only at Lags 2 and 8. All P300 maximal peak amplitude was analyzed from electrode Cz. P300 
amplitude for T1 was scored at 360 – 520ms for both lags. P300 amplitude was extracted from 
700 – 830ms for Lag2 and 1200 – 1330ms for Lag8. Amplitude data were then analyzed using a 
2 (group: high vs. average perceivers) X 2 (Target Position: T1 vs. T2) X 2 (T1 Valence: neutral 
vs. affect) X 2 (T2 Valence: neutral vs. affective) X 2 (Lag Lag2 vs. Lag8).  
Results 
Cardiac awareness groups 
The sample consisted of 19 high perceivers (i.e., average scores ≥ .85 on the cardiac 
awareness task; n = 10 women) and 19 average perceivers (scores < .85; n = 11 women). The 
average score of the BDI for the whole group 5.27 (SD = 4.20). The scores on the BDI-II did not 
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significantly differ between high (M = 5.57, SD = 4.54) and low (M = 4.57, SD = 3.74) 
perceivers (p = .50). The mean score on the task for the whole group was .78 (SD = .16). As 
would be expected, the high perceivers scored significantly higher (M = .91, SD = .05) than did 
the average perceivers [M = .66, SD = .15; t (23) = 8.17, p < .001, d = 2.23] on the cardiac 
awareness task. These scores were comparable to that of the samples of Herbert et al. (2007), 
Herbert et al. (2010), and Pollatos et al. (2005) (ts < 1.2). Both groups had a normal distribution 
of scores as indicated by non-significant Shapiro-Wilks and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (ps > 
.18). The mean age of high perceivers was 19.40 (SD = 3.2) and the mean age for average 
perceivers was 19.63 (SD = 0.96). The two groups did not significantly differ in terms of age or 
sex (both ps > .1). Men and women in the study did not significantly differ in their cardiac 
perception (p = .3), and there was no correlation between age and cardiac perception (r = .064, p 
= .64). Again, Figure 2 presents a histogram of the distribution of cardiac awareness scores for 
both groups.  
Blinks 
Descriptive statistics for blinks and percent accuracy are found in Table 1. The median 
number of blinks across all participants was 38 (M = 49.84; SD = 33.40; range: 14 – 143). 
Results of the omnibus ANOVA showed that there was an expected main effect of Lag [F (2, 72) 
= 32.72, p < .001, ηp2= .48] such that there were fewer blinks at Lag8 (M = 1.88, SE = .21) than 
Lag1 and Lag2 (ps < .001), likely due to increased time between targets. It was unexpected that 
there were somewhat more blinks at Lag1 (M = 5.74, SE = .69) than Lag 2 (M = 5.07, SE = .60; 
p = .060) as greater numbers of blinks at Lag2 than Lag 1 are typically observed (e.g., Martens & 
Wyble, 2010). There was no main effect of group on the number of blinks (F < 0.1, p = .46). 
However, there was a significant Group X T1 Valence X T2 Valence interaction [F (1, 36) = 
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14.41, p = .001, ηp2= .29]. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that average perceivers 
blinked significantly more at NN than NA (p = .001) and at AN, though at a trend-level (p = 
.082). Average perceivers also blinked more at AA than NA (p = .005). High perceivers, 
however, blinked less at AA than NA (p = .042) and AN, though this was a trend-level difference 
(p = .096). No other pairwise comparison approached significance (ps > .19). Figure 3 presents 
results of pairwise comparisons.  
As an exploratory measure, semantic categories were tested as a potential explanation for 
our findings. To do this, trial conditions were collapsed into congruent (sum of blinks at AA and 
NN) vs. incongruent (sum of blinks at NA and NA). These blink totals were then analyzed with 2 
(group: high vs. average perceivers) X 2 (congruence: incongruous vs. congruous trials) mixed-
model repeated measures ANOVA. Results showed neither a significant main effect of group nor 
congruence (ps > .2), though there was a significant Group X Congruence interaction: [F (1, 36) 
= 15.42, p < .001, hp2= .30], such that average perceivers blinked more when the valence of T1 
and T2 were congruent (M = 29.32, SE = 3.73) than the valence of T1 and T2 were incongruent 
(M = 25.47, SE = 4.04, p = .003). Conversely, high perceivers blinked more when the T1 and T2 
valences were incongruent (M = 24.74, SE = 4.05) than when they were congruent (M = 22.00, 
SE = 3.77, p = .027).  
Percent Accuracy. Generally, the percent accuracy reflected the pattern of results seen in 
the elicitation of blinks. There was a significant main effect of Lag [F (2, 74) = 34.54, p < .001, 
hp2= .48], such that performance at Lag8 (M = .89, SE = .01) was better than at Lag1 (M = .69, 
SE = .04) and Lag2 (M = .72, SE = .03; ps < .001), as expected. Accuracy at Lag1 and Lag2 did 
not significantly differ (p = .16). There was also a significant interaction of T1 Valence, T2 
Valence, and Group [F (1, 36) = 14.49, p = .001, hp2= .29]. Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
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showed that average perceivers were significantly more accurate at NA than at AA and NN (ps < 
.01). Conversely, high perceivers were less accurate at AN than at AA (p = .027) and marginally 
to NN (p = .096). Thus, overall, average perceivers were most accurate with a neutral T1 and 
affective T2 (NA). High perceivers were most accurate when both targets were affective (AA). 
Notably, there was no interaction of lag, indicating that these effects were consistent regardless 
of the position of the second target in the stream. Figure 3 presents a graphical representation of 
this interaction.  
In the single-target conditions, there was a significant main effect of valence [F (1, 36) = 
13.17, p = .001, hp2= .27] such that neutral targets were identified with greater accuracy (M = 
.95, SE = .01) than affective targets (M = .91, SE = .01). There was no significant main effect of 
group nor did group significantly interact with target valence (Fs < 0.6, ps > .5). 
P300 
Descriptive statistics for P300 amplitudes are presented in Table 2. Results of the 
omnibus ANOVA revealed an expected and typical main effect of Target Position such that the 
amplitude for the P300 for T1 was significantly larger than for T2 [F (1, 36) = 12.54, p = .001, 
hp2= .26]. There was a significant interaction of Lag and T2 Valence [F (1, 36) = 4.64, p = .038, 
hp2= .11]. The only follow-up pairwise comparison that approached significance for the 
interaction showed that neutral T2 generated a smaller P300 amplitude at Lag2 than at Lag8 (p = 
.13). The remaining pairwise comparisons did not approach significance (ps > .27). Given that 
the higher-level interaction was significant while the post-hoc pairwise comparisons were not, 
these results should be interpreted cautiously. 
There was a significant interaction of Group, Target Position, T1 Valence and T2 
Valence [F (1, 36) = 10.85, p = .010, hp2= .17]. For average perceivers, the P300 to T2 stimuli 
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was significantly smaller than T1 in the AN and NA conditions (ps < .05). Thus, the P300 was 
significantly reduced for the second target when the targets’ valences were incongruent. Finally, 
for average perceivers, the P300 amplitude to T2 in the AN condition was significantly smaller 
than the P300 amplitude to T2 in AA and NA conditions (ps < .05). Thus, the AN condition 
generated a significantly smaller P300 amplitude to the second, neutral target than to its first, 
affective target, which was also significantly smaller than the P300 to the second target in either 
condition with an affective second target. In short, the average perceivers generally exhibited the 
expected interactions of affect and target position, broadly replicating effects that were found in 
previous literature (Yiend, 2010).  
No pairwise comparison approached a level of significance for the high perceivers. There 
was a trend-level attenuation of T2 in the AA condition (p = .10). Figure 4 presents the 
waveforms of both the average and high perceivers. Figure 5 presents the results of these 
analyses for both groups as a bar graph. Thus, counter to hypotheses, high perceivers, did not 
exhibit modulated P300 amplitudes as a function of valence or valence congruence of targets. 
Father, their amplitudes did not significantly differ from those of the average perceivers. 
Waveforms for Lag2 and Lag8 for both high and low perceivers are shown in Figures 4 and 5, 
respectively. These data are presented as a bar graph in Figure 6. 
Relation of P300 amplitudes to blink magnitude. At Lag2, for average perceivers, no 
correlation of blink magnitude — either the sum number of blinks or the number of blinks within 
each category — approached significance as a correlate to P300 amplitudes (ps > .5). However, 
for the high perceivers, greater P300 amplitude at T2 corresponded with greater number of blinks 
in the NN condition (r = .66, p = .002), as was the total number of blinks in the whole task (r = 
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.48, p = .039). These positive correlations are counter to expectations where a larger P300 
amplitude at T2 is generally associated with fewer blinks. 
At Lag 8, for average perceivers, in the NN condition, P300 amplitudes at T1 
significantly correlated with number of blinks in that condition (r = -.46, p = .049). For the high 
perceivers, T2 amplitude was negatively correlated with the number of blinks in the NN 
condition (r = -.57, p = .010) and the NA condition (r = -.52, p = .022). Total number of blinks in 
the study was negatively correlated with the T1 amplitude in the AA condition (r = -.69, p = 
.001) for high perceivers. 
No other correlation in any other condition approached statistical significance for either 
group. 
Discussion 
The main goal of the present study was to explore the relation of the perception of 
emotional stimuli, attention and interoceptive abilities (IA). This study had two related aims 
regarding the emotional AB: (a) to replicate and extend AB methods by using emotional and 
neutral words (rather than the more typical use of symbols and pictures) while using EEG to 
identify neuroelectrical correlates to the task; and (b) to explore the role of IA in AB task 
performance and EEG correlates of an emotional AB. To accomplish these aims, participants 
were recruited who were rated to be high or average in IA based on previously-established cut-
scores from a cardiac awareness task. Participants then completed an attentional blink task while 
EEG was recorded. I had two hypotheses regarding those with average IA. First, 
electrophysiological (i.e., P300 amplitudes) and behavioral (e.g., behavioral accuracy and fewer 
blinks) indices of the AB would reduce when the second target was emotional, regardless of the 
first target. Second, when the first target was affective, I hypothesized that average perceivers 
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would show an enhanced blink effect. In contrast to those with average IA, I hypothesized that 
those with high IA would be less susceptible to the blink effect, but would show a relatively 
enhanced blink when presented with an emotional stimulus at T1. Results provided mixed 
support for these hypotheses. These results nonetheless have important implications for the 
interaction of attention, emotion, and IA.  
Results for average perceivers 
Behavioral Data. Reflective of previous with random samples of healthy participants 
(McHugo et al., 2013; Yiend, 2010), average perceivers exhibited altered behavioral 
performance and electrophysiological indices of a blink as a function of the valence of targets in 
the stream. More specifically, average perceivers were most accurate when presented with a 
neutral (vs. emotional) stimulus at T1 followed by an affective stimulus at T2. Also consistent 
with previous literature and with hypotheses, average perceivers were most likely to “blink” (i.e., 
report that they had seen one stimulus when two had been presented) when an affective stimulus 
was followed by a neutral stimulus. In short, average perceivers had worsened AB performance 
when stimuli were matched on valence (i.e. AA and NN conditions) and best when valence was 
incongruent (i.e. NA and AN). This pattern of performance was further confirmed in an 
exploratory analysis comparing number of blinks in congruent and incongruent trial types.  
There are several explanations for the pattern of behavioral response. Congruent stimuli 
may be perceived and processed, to some degree, as members of a similar semantic category (De 
Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002). Previous research suggests that targets 
belonging to the same semantic category enhance the blink compared to targets that are 
semantically distinct (Tibboel et al., 2011). Thus, the affective valence of the targets may not 
have been as important in the performance of the task as the broader semantic network or 
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category they belong to (e.g., “negative words”). This phenomenon has been previously observed 
in random samples, and it has been suggested that the presence of an emotional word heightens 
sensitivity to search for another negative word (Yiend, 2010). In the case of affective words 
following neutral words, the heightened salience may simultaneously increase attention to the 
second target and, depending on the timing and arousal of the stimulus, create a type of 
retrograde interference with T1 (Asplund et al., 2010; Kennedy & Most, 2015; Most & Jungé, 
2008; Zakay & Block, 2004). 
The results of the average perceivers’ behavioral data reflect several other findings in 
previous studies. The NN condition in the present study is likely the closest analog to previous 
tasks that used non-affective, non-lexical stimuli (Kawahara et al., 2006; Martens & Wyble, 
2010; McHugo et al., 2013; Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that NN was the condition that resulted in the lowest accuracy and most blinks. 
Consistent with previous research (Schwabe et al., 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2010), the NA 
condition resulted in the fewest blinks and highest accuracy. The attenuated blink may have 
resulted from attentional orienting and other processes being directed toward a T1 target that is 
overridden when the T2 is arousing, potentially threatening, or otherwise notable (McHugo et al., 
2013). The AA condition enhanced the blink effect, consistent with previous work (Schwabe et 
al., 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2010). Schwabe and colleagues suggest that affective T2 stimuli 
typically “break through” the mechanisms responsible for the blink, however, when preceded by 
an affective stimulus, the attentional resources are already dedicated over-allocated to T1. 
Another possibility is downstream “bottlenecking,” wherein the second aversive target prevents 
the successful encoding of both targets (Yiend, 2010). This result challenges the “Boost and 
Bounce” hypothesis of the AB, as the presence of an aversive stimulus at T1 thwarted the 
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“boost” (Lunau & Olivers, 2010; Olivers, 2010). To better understand the mechanisms for the 
observed effects, future studies could consider including affective stimuli in streams that contain 
more than two targets. 
P300. In addition to the behavioral responses, average perceivers’ EEG was modulated 
robustly as a function of the affective content of stimuli. The P300 amplitude to T2 was 
significantly reduced compared to that of T1 when the valence of the two targets were 
incongruent. The greatest attenuation of the P300 occurred for T2 in the AN, was significantly 
smaller than the P300 to both T1 in that condition and to the T2 in the AA and NA conditions. 
Notably, these incongruent valence conditions were also the conditions to result in the fewest 
blinks and the highest accuracy for this group. There are several explanations for the behavioral 
and EEG data in the present study. 
The P300 amplitude to the second target in the AN and NA condition was significantly 
attenuated compared to their T1. In other words, the two conditions with incongruent T1 and T2 
valences resulted in a significant decrement in the P300 to T2. Further, in the AN condition, the 
P300 amplitude to T2 was significantly smaller than that of the AA and the NA condition. This 
reduction in P300 amplitude would indicate an increased likelihood of a blink (Martens et al., 
2006b; Martens & Wyble, 2010; Shapiro et al., 2006; Willems & Martens, 2015), yet NA 
resulted in the fewest blinks overall while AA and NN resulted in the most. It may be that, while 
the P300 was attenuated for a T2 in an incongruent valence from T1, these P300 amplitudes did 
generally exceed a threshold to result in encoding and attentional orientation. This finding 
generally supports previous work that that found performance in the AB task may not be fully 
accounted by ERP components related to higher-level linguistic processes and memory 
encoding. The blink may, therefore, occur because of post-perceptual processes. The present data 
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further support this postulation. The post-perceptual impairment was initially suggested in a set 
of classic studies wherein electrophysiological indices of perception and semantic processing 
(e.g., the P300 and N400) were predictably impacted by semantic relatedness (i.e. larger 
amplitudes for less related content), yet the behavioral expression of the attentional blink was not 
impacted by content (Luck et al., 1996; Rolke et al., 2001; Vogel et al., 1998). Additionally, 
irrelevant distractors that occurred outside after T2 in a stream did not impact target-related P300 
amplitudes, but did correspond to increased blinks (Dux & Marois, 2008; Lunau & Olivers, 
2010; Most et al., 2007). Therefore, modulation of the blink effect may be due to any number of 
stimulus-driven variables in the general population. 
It is notable that the correlation of blinks to P300 amplitudes was less robust for average 
perceivers than for high perceivers. No significant correlations occurred at Lag2. At Lag8, 
increased T1 amplitudes corresponded to fewer blinks overall, but only in the NN condition. This 
is consistent with previous work (Shapiro et al., 2006), which posited that over-allocation of 
cognitive resources to T1 impedes the ability to encode T2. However, it is not clear why the 
P300 amplitudes for average perceivers were not more robustly associated with behavioral 
responses. The correlation between T1 and behavioral accuracy may have been impeded in the 
use of affective stimuli at T2, which “breaks through” the over-allocation to neutral stimuli and, 
thus, reduces the blink (Most & Jungé, 2008), particularly if attention spread is boosted at T1 
(Olivers, 2007, 2010). Affective T1 may provide no additional boost than neutral T1 and, 
instead, “capture” some component of attention related to emotion and affect that is not observed 
in the P300, which then results in an enhanced blink effects if T2 is neutral, but not if it is 
affective  (Most & Jungé, 2008).  
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Results for high perceivers. Novel to the present study was the examination of 
individual differences in interoceptive abilities, as measured by cardiac awareness, in the 
performance in, and EEG response to, the AB. The behavioral and EEG data for the high 
perceivers stands in contrast to the average perceivers. I hypothesized that high perceivers would 
have greater vigilance and sensitivity to emotional stimuli than average perceivers, as 
demonstrated by decreased blinks and increased P300 amplitudes, particularly to emotional T2 
stimuli. I also hypothesized that P300 amplitudes in high perceivers would be larger than those 
generated by average perceivers. My hypotheses for high perceivers were not supported. In fact, 
behaviorally, average perceivers performed best at AA, with the fewest blinks and greatest 
accuracy, followed closely by NN. In terms of EEG, high perceivers elicited statistically 
comparable P300 amplitudes between all conditions and target positions. Despite these 
hypotheses not being supported, results further our understanding of the role of trait-level IA in 
cognitive and affective stimulus processing.  
My hypotheses were derived from previous literature that indicated that individuals with 
high IA show attentional bias to emotional stimuli — especially negative — measured by 
behavioral and/or electrophysiological methodologies (Critchley et al., 2013; Garfinkel et al., 
2013; Herbert et al., 2010; Pollatos et al., 2005; Werner, Mannhart, Reyes Del Paso, & Duschek, 
2014; Werner et al., 2010). In turn, extant literature suggests that high IA is positively associated 
with neuroticism, anxiety, and other pathologies (Barrett et al., 2004; Paulus & Stein, 2006, 
2010; Wiens, 2005). The present results support a more optimistic view of those with trait-level 
high IA. One interpretation of the data is that high perceivers reoriented their attentional – and 
therefore emotional – functioning to complete the task. There is some evidence that high 
perceivers have improved executive control of attention (Matthias et al., 2009), general learning 
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abilities (Katkin, Wiens, & Öhman, 2001), and adaptive decision making abilities (Werner et al., 
2009) particularly when emotions are invoked (Sutterlin, Schulz, Stumpf, Pauli, & Vogele, 
2013b). Perhaps as a result, high perceivers have been found to exhibit improved trait-level 
emotion regulation (Kever et al., 2015b) and are better at utilizing top-down mechanisms to 
control emotion such as through instruction for reappraisal (Fustos et al., 2013).  
These laboratory-based findings have real-world implications and may illustrate the 
adaptiveness of high IA. Both adults (Matthias & Pollatos, 2014; Pollatos, Matthias, & Keller, 
2015) and children (De Witte, Sutterlin, Braet, & Mueller, 2016; Koch & Pollatos, 2014) with 
high IA are more likely to be resilient in the face of social exclusion and social pain. High IA 
may be protective against eating disorders (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Lattimore et al., 2017), 
alexithymia (Herbert et al., 2011), depression (Paulus & Stein, 2010), and is associated with 
fewer and less severe symptoms of psychosis (Ardizzi et al., 2016) and autism (Garfinkel et al., 
2016). In addition, persons with high IA more frequently show empathy, which is considered to 
be an adaptive emotional expression (Ernst, Northoff, Boker, Seifritz, & Grimm, 2013; 
Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011). Finally, those with high IA show better responses to 
psychological interventions. For example, individuals with high IA show increased benefits from 
mindfulness-based interventions (Farb et al., 2013; Kirk, Downar, & Montague, 2011; Parkin et 
al., 2013) and respond better to psychotherapy (Masdrakis et al., 2013). Thus, high IA does not 
exclusively reflect and predict an increase in neuroticism, emotional lability, or over-allocation 
of attention to threat; instead, it represents an increased ability to have efficacy during emotional 
experience to maintain goal-directed behavior.  
The use of a cognitively challenging AB task may be another explanation for the 
divergence of the present findings with those of previous studies. Previous studies that 
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established attentional bias for affective stimuli for those with high IA often used tasks that 
involved minimal strategy or challenge. These tasks have included passive viewing (e.g., Herbert 
et al., 2010; Herbert et al., 2007), word stem completion with subsequent recall assessment 
(Werner et al., 2010), and a Stroop paradigm (Werner et al., 2014). While those with high IA 
may, in fact, have a bias to negative information, when asked to strategize or complete a 
challenging task, these individuals are more adept at top-down regulation of attention for the 
purposes of task completion than were average perceivers. In the case of the present task, high 
perceivers may have been better able to regulate their emotional reactivity as a function of 
improved top-down cognitive control and spread of attention compared to average perceivers 
(Matthias et al., 2009). It is well-established that the blink effect is attenuated by online 
regulation of emotion, motivation, and affect (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Raymond & O'Brien, 
2009). Therefore, the high perceivers in the present study may not have viewed each stimulus as 
equally threatening — as hypothesized— but were able to better regulate their attention and 
affect to view all stimuli as equally neutral. As a result, the present data suggest that high 
perceivers likely approached the task in a two-step process: first, through down-regulated 
emotional reactivity (most clearly seen in P300 data that did not significantly vary as a function 
of valence), which then allowed for an approach to the task and second through semantic 
categorization processes. 
P300. Evidence for the postulation that high perceivers elicited down-regulated 
emotional reactivity through a spread of attentional resources to stimuli is provided by P300 
data. In no condition did the P300 amplitude significantly change at T2 compared to T1, nor did 
any P300 amplitude significantly differ between any condition. Previous work indicated that the 
blink occurs because of an over-allocation of resources to T1 (Shapiro et al., 2006). One could 
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interpret the present findings as high perceivers being more adept at reducing over-focus to T1 
(even aversive T1) to better accomplish the task. In other words, this study serves as an extension 
of previous work (Matthias et al., 2009) and shows that high perceivers were better able to 
distribute their attention more evenly across stimuli, even overriding the otherwise reflexive 
emotional capture of the affective qualities of the targets. This would have allowed them to 
reorient their cognitive control strategies in such a way that the expected reactivity was not 
reflected in modulated brain electrophysiological reactivity.  
Behavioral data. While the P300 amplitudes reflect the down-regulation of affective 
response to stimuli, the behavioral data may reflect post-perceptual processes putatively 
associated with the AB. For high perceivers, congruent affective categories of targets (AA and 
NN) resulted in the fewest blinks and best behavioral accuracy while incongruent categories of 
targets (AN and NA) resulted in the lowest behavioral accuracy and greatest number of blinks. If 
the affective responses to stimuli becomes muted, as reflected in the P300, it is possible that the 
high perceivers would then view these words as belonging to a semantic category (e.g., neutral 
versus emotional). Thus, what may be driving the behavioral results is a process related to 
semantic categorization rather than emotional reactivity. Spreading activation hypotheses posit 
that within-category members are easier to detect when primed (Collins & Loftus, 1975). It is 
adaptive, though more difficult, to maintain awareness of categorically or aesthetically similar 
objects under cognitive strain (Kennedy & Most, 2015; Most et al., 2005a; Most et al., 2001; 
Tibboel et al., 2011). High-perceivers evidenced no emotional interference and a benefit of 
congruent semantic categories in a manner like spread of activation. The spread of activation 
may have been enhanced by the so-called boost and bounce model of the AB (Olivers, 2010). 
For high perceivers, the semantic category of T1 (affective/neutral) may be a prime for a 
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subsequent member of that semantic category at T2. IN this model, when the high perceiver 
views a T2 from a different category, it becomes more difficult to encode it. 
The second model is that of a “bottleneck” or “rubberneck” of attention (Kawahara et al., 
2006; Most et al., 2005a). In this model, attention is not depleted, but is temporarily impeded 
from spreading to T2 (Martens et al., 2006b; Martens & Valchev, 2009; Most et al., 2005a; 
Shapiro et al., 2006). Notably, at Lag2, the average perceivers’ P300 amplitude at T1 positively 
correlated to blinks in the NN condition while the high perceivers did not. Instead, in the same 
condition, high perceivers P300 amplitudes to T2 positively corresponded to blinks. This result 
may be due to the “rubberneck” aspect of these models in which interference is caused by either 
the second target or some process that occurs after T2 offset (Asplund et al., 2010; Most & 
Jungé, 2008; Most et al., 2007). High perceivers were seemingly more susceptible to over 
allocation of cognitive resources to T2 while average perceivers were more sensitive to over-
allocation to resources at T1. 
Conversely, at Lag8 for the NN and NA conditions, T2 amplitudes negatively correlated 
with blink frequencies. This increased P300 may no longer indicate interference due to the 
extended time from T1, but would indicate a more expected pattern of encoding which is 
seemingly a more consistent process for high perceivers than for average perceiver. Notably, the 
high perceivers demonstrated this pattern while the average perceivers did not. 
Broader Implications and Applications 
The results of the present study can inform our understanding of the mechanisms of the 
AB, attention, and emotional experience, and how interoception may interact with these 
processes. Within this study are several important replications and extensions of previous 
research. For example, there are a limited number of studies including an emotional AB using 
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lexical stimuli. To date, only a few studies have counterbalanced emotional stimuli for 
either/both T1 and T2 (Most et al., 2005a; Most & Jungé, 2008; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & 
Simons, 2005b; Yiend, 2010). To my knowledge, this is the first study to utilize EEG to explore 
the individual differences in interoception in neural activation during an emotional attentional 
blink task. Taken together, the results of the present study have important implications for the 
role of the body in emotional experience. 
Implications for the AB. There is limited consensus on the mechanisms of the AB (Dux 
& Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010). Using emotional lexical stimuli in an AB task is a 
necessary step to understand the mechanisms and limitations of the phenomenon and, by 
extension, attention itself. It was initially proposed that the AB indexes depletion of limited 
attentional resources during T1, but clearly this cannot be the case if the emotional stimuli so 
consistently “break through” the supposed attentional depletion (McHugo et al., 2013; Yiend, 
2010). The present study provides further evidence of the complicated nature of the AB 
regarding valence of stimuli. The traditional window of the “blink” was not clearly observed in 
the present study: regardless of valence of stimuli, Lag1 resulted in more blinks than Lag2, 
though Lag8 resulted in the fewest. While this effect was marginal, Lag2 typically results in the 
most blinks. This may have been due to the use of lexical stimuli as they are more feature-rich 
than individual symbols such as letters, shapes, and numbers. Luck, Vogel, and colleagues 
(1996; 1998) also used words as targets, but their distractors were all letters while the present 
study was a mix of letters and symbols. Perhaps the mix of symbols and letters provided 
sufficient distinctiveness to prevent the typical blink pattern from emerging. Regardless of the 
content of the words themselves, the orthography of a word compared to a string of non-words 
likely provided sufficient distinctiveness to otherwise undo the typical pattern of blinks being 
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maximal at Lag2 (Wyble et al., 2009). The words used were all high frequency, and high 
frequency words at T1 have been found to reduce the blink while increasing blinks when at T2 
(Wierda, Taatgen, van Rijn, & Martens, 2013).  
Beyond surface features of the stimuli, the present study supports previous research that 
content of stimuli, specifically the semantics of targets, play a key role in attention as measured 
by the AB (Kennedy & Most, 2015; Rolke et al., 2001; Tibboel et al., 2011). In a set of classic 
AB studies, words that were embedded in the RSVP stream that were unrelated (nurse – thunder) 
were reported with comparable accuracy than related pairs (nurse – doctor), even though the 
N400 component was elicited as expected with greater amplitudes for unrelated targets (Luck et 
al., 1996; Rolke et al., 2001; Vogel et al., 1998). The authors argue that the stimuli and their 
features were seen but not encoded accurately, therefore, some element of the blink effect is due 
to post-perceptual processing. The present study supports this finding, but suggests that it is 
modulated as a function of IA. The high perceivers may have been able to down-regulate the 
affective response to words and treat stimuli as a prime for members of the same category while 
average perceivers were more susceptible to emotional features of the words that prevented these 
processes from occurring. 
Positive valence was not examined in the present study. The present study leaves 
unanswered whether attention is biased selectively to negative information or to emotional 
information in general. It has been proposed that there are separate systems for evaluating 
negative, threatening, or otherwise aversive stimuli than there is for evaluating approachable, 
appetitive, or otherwise pleasant stimuli (Carretie et al., 2009). It may also be that emotional 
stimuli, in general, capture attention comparably regardless of valence, with, perhaps, a slight 
preference or automatic processing for positive stimuli (Benau et al., In Press; Citron, Abugaber, 
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& Herbert, 2015; Vanlessen, De Raedt, Koster, & Pourtois, 2016; Yang et al., 2013). Preliminary 
work in our lab suggests that individuals with high IA are biased to positive stimuli referring to 
physical attributes (Benau & Atchley, Under Review). 
In addition to bottom-up, stimulus driven influences in the AB, the present study 
underscores that the AB is also driven by participant characteristics. There is a notable dearth of 
research examining individual differences in the AB. While some research has investigated trait-
level imperviousness to the blink (Martens et al., 2006b; Martens & Valchev, 2009; Taatgen et 
al., 2009; Willems & Martens, 2015; Willems et al., 2013), these investigations have focused on 
neurocognitive functioning. The present study contributes to the limited previous work that 
found individual differences such as state and trait emotion, cognitive abilities, and motivation 
influence the AB (McHugo et al., 2013; Yiend, 2010). Namely, heightened motivation and 
positive affect tend increase blink susceptibility while negative affect and distractibility reduce 
the blink effect (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010; 
McHugo et al., 2013; Yiend, 2010). The present study adds to the literature examining IA and 
attention as measured by the AB (Garfinkel et al., 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2014). It is important to 
continue examining the interaction of individual differences and cognitive functions — 
particularly attention — to better the composition and function of both. The present study 
contributes to the growing literature that suggests that, attention, particularly as measured in the 
AB, is more flexible, adaptive, and individually-variant than initially proposed (Dux & Marois, 
2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010; Petersen & Posner, 2012), and provides further evidence that IA 
influences, or is influenced by, attention (Matthias et al., 2009). 
Implications for Interoception, Attention, and Emotion. The present findings contribute 
to our understanding of the relation between sensitivity to bodily sensations and attention and 
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attentional biases. One question the present study sought to address is: do people with heightened 
IA have increased attention selectively to emotional stimuli, increased attentional skills more 
generally, or some combination of both? The present study provides support for previous work 
that showed that high perceivers exhibit generally superior attention ability compared to average 
or low perceivers (Matthias et al., 2009), though it is unclear if this was cause or consequence of 
improved emotional down-regulation compared to average perceivers. Previous work showed 
that affective stimuli either impede encoding of upstream and downstream neutral stimuli (Most 
& Jungé, 2008; Yiend, 2010). The present results indicate that this effect may be limited to 
average perceivers. The results of the present study showed that high perceivers elicited P300 
amplitudes that did not modulate as a function stimulus valence at any target position and 
showed no effect of valence other than as a semantic category in behavioral response. This 
finding provides further evidence that those with high IA have improved top-down control of 
attention, perhaps allowing for enhanced or speeded reappraisal and attentional reorientation 
(Fustos et al., 2013; Kever et al., 2015b). Future research would do well to explore this aspect 
further. 
Applications. There are several applications for these findings. First, it provides a target 
for cognition-oriented treatments. Emphasizing visceral or somatic control (e.g., meditation, 
relaxed breathing) rather than solely focus on cognitive distortions has also shown efficacy in 
improving cognition and emotional distress (Farb et al., 2013; Kirk et al., 2011; Parkin et al., 
2013; Sedlmeier et al., 2012). Research suggests that modifying visceral reactions to emotional 
stimuli (e.g., deliberate modification of these reactions through exercise, meditation, or focused 
and relaxed breathing) also reduces and enhances emotional responses when engaged routinely 
(e.g., Goyal et al., 2014); effects of which are seen as quickly as a single session (Fennell, Benau, 
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& Atchley, 2016). These findings highlight the importance of physiological changes in addition 
to cognitive reappraisal. Hyperarousal enhances attention to threat-related, but not neutral 
stimuli, as evidenced by results of an AB task (Kever et al., 2015a; Kever et al., 2015b). 
Promoting relaxation and control of arousal may, in turn, reduce biased attention to emotional 
stimuli and, therefore, reduce its deleterious effects.  
Interestingly, individuals with pathology wherein the body is a source of distress (e.g., 
chronic pain, fibromyalgia, panic disorder), tend to use denial and ignoring bodily signals as a 
coping mechanism; however, this technique exacerbates symptoms (McCracken & Eccleston, 
2003). Conversely, increasing IA (including emphasis on pain) has been found to decrease 
symptoms and distress (Bakal, Coll, & Schaefer, 2008), especially when paired with elements of 
acceptance and other adaptive coping skills (Veehof, Oskam, Schreurs, & Bohlmeijer, 2011). 
Similar to the high perceivers in the present task, increased awareness of bodily signals allows an 
individual to regulate, contextualize, and utilize these signals more adaptively (Bakal et al., 
2008). In addition to the physical distress described above, increasing evidence suggests that 
interoceptive training improves cognition, social skills, and both physical and psychological 
wellbeing in both healthy individuals and those with medical and/or psychological pathology 
(Bornemann, Herbert, Mehling, & Singer, 2014; Bornemann & Singer, 2017; Farb et al., 2015; 
Farb & Mehling, 2016; Farb et al., 2013; Schaefer, Egloff, Gerlach, & Witthoft, 2014; Shah, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2017). The benefits of increased IA are also seen across the lifespan (Koch & 
Pollatos, 2014; Murphy, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2017). The benefits of increased IA are also 
seen across the lifespan (Koch & Pollatos, 2014; Murphy et al., 2017). The present study 
supports IA to be an adaptive function. Clinicians should consider integrating interoceptive 
awareness into their treatment plans and case conceptualizations.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
This study provides an important insight into the mechanisms of attention, the attentional 
blink, and interoceptive awareness, but it is not without limitations. The sample was comprised 
of otherwise healthy, self-selected undergraduates at one Midwestern university. Interoception 
has been found to modulate as a function of culture and age (Khalsa & Lapidus 2016; Khalsa, 
Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009; Ma-Kellams, 2014). Therefore, additional samples are needed to 
generalize and replicate the present findings. The present study was cross-sectional, and, 
therefore, causation of these associations cannot be determined. As discussed above, 
experimental investigations of interoceptive training may elucidate causality of the relationships 
seen here. It was beyond the scope to investigate other aspects of valence and arousal of stimuli 
and this is certainly an avenue for future studies to explore (e.g., positive valence, high vs. low 
arousal, personally-relevant stimuli). Similar to previous research, the arousing words were 
somewhat less frequent than the neutral words; however, similar to previous research, this should 
have resulted in a pattern opposite of what was seen (Anderson, 2005). Lastly, although the 
present cardiac awareness task is well-established, there are limitations to it that have been 
discussed elsewhere (Khalsa & Lapidus 2016; Kleckner, Wormwood, Simmons, Barrett, & 
Quigley, 2015). Therefore, future studies could consider additional or alternative tasks and/or 
modifications to the present one (e.g., additional trials; different measures IA such as challenge 
tasks). 
Conclusion 
In sum, this study has broad implications for improving our knowledge of the interactions 
and relations between attention, emotion, and interoception. The AB is not only influenced by 
state-level motivation, but trait-level IA. The findings also show that those with high IA are not 
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simply more attuned to spreading attentional resources to both interoceptive and exteroceptive 
stimuli, but that they are likely more in control of the ability to monitor and control the resources 
needed to accomplish the task. Future research should further investigate the role of IA in the 
perception of emotional stimuli using other tasks involving cognitive control, attention, and other 
executive functions to further clarify the present findings. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics [M (SE)] for behavioral data. 
 
Lag T1 Valence T2 Valence Average High 
   
 Blinks  
Lag1 Affective Affective 6.95 (0.94) 4.68 (0.94) 
  Neutral 5.90 (1.01) 5.21 (1.02) 
 Neutral Affective 5.68 (1.07) 5.37 (1.07) 
  Neutral 7.11 (1.05) 5.05 (1.06) 
Lag2 Affective Affective 5.05 (0.92) 4.79 (0.91) 
  Neutral 5.42 (1.00) 5.00 (1.02) 
 Neutral Affective 4.58 (0.90) 5.34 (0.90) 
  Neutral 6.05 (0.83) 4.37 (0.84) 
Lag8 Affective Affective 2.26 (0.34) 1.32 (0.34) 
  Neutral 2.21 (0.51) 2.05 (0.51) 
 Neutral Affective 1.68 (0.30) 1.74 (0.30) 
  Neutral 1.90 (0.41) 1.84 (0.41) 
     
  Percent Accuracy  
Lag1 Affective Affective 0.62 (0.05) 0.75 (0.05) 
  Neutral 0.68 (0.05) 0.71 (0.05) 
 Neutral Affective 0.69 (0.06) 0.72 (0.06) 
  Neutral 0.63 (0.06) 0.74 (0.05) 
Lag2 Affective Affective 0.72 (0.05) 0.74 (0.05) 
  Neutral 0.69 (0.06) 0.71 (0.06) 
 Neutral Affective 0.74 (0.05) 0.72 (0.05) 
  Neutral 0.68 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04) 
Lag8 Affective Affective 0.87 (0.02) 0.92 (0.02) 
  Neutral 0.87 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 
 Neutral Affective 0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) 
  Neutral 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.03) 
Note: Values are rounded and represent estimated marginal means. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics [M (SE)] for P300 amplitudes. 
Position Lag T1 Valence T2 Valence Average High 
T1 Lag2 Affective Affective 3.40 (0.32) 3.27 (0.32) 
   Neutral 4.33 (0.45) 3.22 (0.45) 
  Neutral Affective 3.78 (0.48) 3.66 (0.48) 
   Neutral 3.57 (0.47) 3.33 (0.47) 
 Lag8 Affective Affective 3.44 (0.49) 2.77 (0.49) 
   Neutral 2.33 (0.46) 2.66 (0.46) 
  Neutral Affective 3.10 (0.41) 3.22 (0.41) 
   Neutral 3.08 (0.40) 2.77 (0.39) 
T2 Lag2 Affective Affective 3.71 (0.45) 3.45 (0.45) 
   Neutral 3.88 (0.48) 3.13 (0.48) 
  Neutral Affective 4.01 (0.50) 3.28 (0.50) 
   Neutral 4.21 (0.45) 3.74 (0.45) 
 Lag8 Affective Affective 2.96 (0.38) 2.91 (0.38) 
   Neutral 2.73 (0.41) 3.46 (0.42) 
  Neutral Affective 2.80 (0.42) 2.90 (0.43) 
   Neutral 3.38 (0.43) 3.01 (0.43) 
Note: Values are rounded and represent estimated marginal means. 
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Fig. 2: Schematic of the AB task used in the present study illustrating the location of the target 
stimuli in each lag. Note that the sample trial here is an AA trial at Lag8. Sample distractor 






























• 40 “single trial” with T1 only
• 20 affective targets, 20 neutral targets
• 40 trials with no targets
• 240 dual target conditions in Lag1, Lag2 and Lag8
• 20 trials each within Lag1, Lag2, and Lag8
• Affective T1 and T2 (AA)
• Affective T1 and neutral T2 (AN)
• Neutral T1 and affective T2 (NA)
• Neutral T1 and T2 (NN)








Fig. 3: Results of behavioral data showing blinks (left) and behavioral accuracy (right). Low 
perceiver data are shown on the left portion of the graphs while high perceiver data are shown on 
the right portion. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. Arrows point indicate 
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Fig. 4: Waveforms for Lag2 for high perceivers (upper panel) and average perceivers (lower panel). 
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Fig. 5: Waveforms for Lag8 for high perceivers (upper panel) and average perceivers (lower 
panel). Target onset is highlighted by vertical dashed lines. P300 windows for T1 and T2 are 
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Fig. 6: Bar graph depicting average peak P300 amplitudes for both targets at each condition for 
average perceivers (left) and high perceivers (right).  
* T2 significantly smaller than T1 in AN and NA.  
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